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oVerVieW — Medicare Advantage (MA) plans are an important source 
of supplemental benefits for many Medicare beneficiaries. Often, MA plans 
are able to finance these extra benefits only because Medicare is paying 
them more than it would have spent to cover the same beneficiaries on a 
fee-for-service basis. As Congress considers curbing MA plan payments, 
this background paper explains how MA plans are paid and reviews recent 
trends in plan participation and enrollment. It then considers key issues 
raised by proposals to change the payment system.
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Medicare Advantage 
Payment Policy
The Medicare program has been contracting with private health plans to 
serve beneficiaries since the 1970s. Plan participation and enrollment grew 
rapidly in the 1990s but then dropped sharply, partly because of legisla-
tion in 1997 that restricted growth in Medicare payments in some areas. 
More recently, the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003, the law 
that established the Part D prescription drug coverage program, made 
changes that have resulted in higher payments to what are now known 
as Medicare Advantage (MA) plans. As a result, many more private plan 
options are available to beneficiaries, and MA enrollment has risen dramati-
cally, reaching 8.2 million enrollees—nearly one in five beneficiaries—as 
of June 2007. 
MA plans usually provide broader benefits than the original Medicare 
program at a lower cost to beneficiaries than other sources of supplemental 
coverage, such as the individual Medigap policies sold by private insurers. 
However, many plans are able to finance these extra benefits only because 
Medicare is paying them more than it would have spent to cover the same 
beneficiaries on a fee-for-service basis. In the face of pressures to reduce 
Medicare spending and the overall deficit, Congress is considering possible 
reductions in MA plan payments. Critics of these proposals contend that 
they would sharply reduce access to MA plans and cut off an important 
source of benefits for low-income and minority beneficiaries.
BacKGrounD: ma Plan PaymentS 
anD recent trenDS
Most Medicare beneficiaries in an area served by an MA plan may choose 
to enroll in that plan during an annual open enrollment period. The plan 
receives a fixed monthly payment from Medicare, in return for which it 
accepts the financial risk for furnishing the full range of services covered 
by Medicare Part A (hospital insurance) and Part B (supplementary medi-
cal insurance, which covers physician and outpatient services). Many MA 
plans, known as MA-PD plans, also include coverage of prescription drugs 
under the new Medicare Part D program. Plans commonly provide addi-
tional benefits, including reductions in required Medicare cost sharing and 
coverage of services excluded from Medicare. In some cases, beneficiaries 
may have to pay the plan a premium; this is in addition to the premium 
($93.50 a month in 2007) paid by all beneficiaries enrolled in Part B. Many 
MA plans have a zero premium for their entire benefit package, and a few 
also offer a full or partial reduction of the Part B premium.1
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types of ma Plans
There are four basic types of MA plans: 
local coordinated care plans (ccPs) include health maintenance organi-
zations (HMOs), preferred provider organizations (PPOs), and provider-
sponsored organizations (PSOs). Each local CCP serves a county or set 
of counties selected by the organization itself, with the approval of the 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS).2 Except in emergencies, 
enrollees in HMOs must obtain services through the plan’s network of af-
filiated providers. PPO enrollees may use out-of-plan providers but may 
incur higher out-of-pocket costs for these providers’ services. (A PSO may 
adopt either structure, and some HMOs offer a point-of-service option 
that resembles a PPO.) A CCP must offer at least one MA-PD option in its 
service area; it may offer plans without prescription drug coverage, but 
enrollees in such plans may not obtain Part D coverage separately through 
a freestanding prescription drug plan (PDP).
regional PPos operate like local PPOs, except that they agree to cover one 
or more geographic regions defined by CMS instead of defining their own 
service areas. (CMS has divided the country into 26 PPO regions.) If they 
are unable to establish a provider network in some parts of the region, 
enrollees must be allowed to obtain out-of-network services without fi-
nancial penalties.
Private fee-for-service (PffS) plans, like local CCPs, define their own service 
areas. A PFFS plan usually does not have a provider network. An enrollee 
in a non-network PFFS plan may use any provider willing to accept the 
plan’s payment, which may not be less than what original Medicare would 
pay for the same service. A PFFS plan does not have to offer prescription 
drug coverage; if it does not, the enrollee may obtain this coverage sepa-
rately through a freestanding PDP.
medical savings account (mSa) plans offer high-deductible coverage in 
conjunction with a tax-favored medical savings account that can be used 
by the enrollee for cost sharing or noncovered services. They resemble the 
combination health savings account/high-deductible health plans offered 
by private health insurers and employer group plans.
A single health insurance company or other organization may offer two 
or more of the basic models in a given area. In the District of Columbia, 
for example, Aetna offers a local HMO, a local PPO, a regional PPO, and a 
PFFS plan. Within each model an organization may offer several distinct 
plans with different beneficiary premiums and supplemental benefits. Aetna 
has four different HMO plans in the District of Columbia. In this paper, 
“organization” will be used to refer to an entity contracting with CMS, 
while “plan” will refer to a specific model and set of benefits offered by an 
organization in a given area. Six organizations—UHC/Pacificare, Humana, 
Kaiser Permanente, Wellpoint, Highmark, and Health Net—accounted for 
half of total MA enrollment in June 2007.3
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fiGure 1
Distribution of medicare advantage enrollees 












*”All other” includes MSA plans, regional 
PPOs, employer or union plans contracting 
directly with CMS as MA plans, and the 
Program of All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly 
(PACE) plans and similar demonstrations, 
which cover both Medicare and Medicaid 
services for the frail elderly. 
Source: Author’s analysis of Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) June 




An organization may offer special needs plans 
(SNPs), which are designed to serve a specific 
subpopulation of Medicare beneficiaries, such as 
dual Medicare/Medicaid eligibles, people with 
chronic illnesses or disabilities, or institutional-
ized beneficiaries. The bidding and payment 
process for SNPs, except for certain plans treated 
as demonstration projects, is generally the same 
as for plans serving the general population.
As of June 2007, nearly all MA enrollees were in 
local CCPs or PFFS plans (Figure 1). MSA plans, 
although authorized by law in 1997, were never 
actually offered until this year. Regional PPOs are 
available to approximately 88 percent of beneficia-
ries but have not yet attracted many enrollees.
Plan Bidding and Payment
For each contract year and each plan it wishes to offer, an MA organization 
submits a bid reflecting its monthly revenue requirements for providing 
the core Part A and Part B benefits to its projected Medicare population. 
This bid includes costs for services, as well as administrative costs and a 
projected surplus or profit amount (or sometimes a loss). Note that the bid 
is net of the average amount enrollees would pay in cost sharing under 
the usual Medicare rules, such as the inpatient deductible and 20 percent 
coinsurance for most part B services. Most plans actually require lower 
cost sharing by enrollees, but this is an extra benefit accounted for later in 
the process. CMS may review bids for reasonableness and may negotiate 
bid amounts with plans other than PFFS and MSA plans.
Once the bid is approved, CMS compares it to a benchmark amount to 
determine whether the beneficiary will have to pay a basic premium for the 
core benefits or whether the plan will receive a rebate with which to finance 
extra benefits. There are actually two separate comparisons involved; these 
differ in the way they adjust for demographic and health risk differences 
between the plan’s enrollees and other Medicare beneficiaries. For the sake 
of simplicity, the following discussion assumes that a plan’s enrollees are 
representative of all beneficiaries in its market area.
CMS annually establishes a separate benchmark for each county; the 
benchmark for a plan serving multiple counties is a weighted average of 
the county benchmarks based on the expected geographic distribution 
of its enrollees. If the plan’s bid is higher than the benchmark, Medicare 
will pay the plan the benchmark amount, and the beneficiary will have to 
pay a premium for the core benefits equal to the excess of the bid over the 
benchmark (in addition to any premium needed to cover extra benefits). 
If the plan’s bid is less than the benchmark, Medicare will pay the plan 
its bid amount plus 75 percent of the difference between the bid and the 
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taBle 1
illustrative calculation of Plan Bid, 
medicare Payment, extra Benefits, 
and Beneficiary Premium
ma-PD 1 ma-PD 
Benchmark  $88  $88 
Plan Bid 
— expected gross revenue 
     requirement for Part a / 
     Part B benefits
 $803  $845 
— less cost-sharing amounts 
     enrollees would pay under 
     original Medicare rules
 $85  $91 
— net Bid  $718  $7 
Benchmark minus Bid  $164  $128 
rebate (75% of benchmark less bid)  $1  $9 
total Base medicare Payment 
     Before demographic, risk, 
     or geographic adjustment
$81 $80
extra Benefits
— 50% reduction in Medicare 
     cost-sharing
 $43  $46 
— Buy-down of Part d basic 
     premium
 $30  $30 
— Buy-down of premium for 
     enhanced Part d coverage
 $15  Basic coverage 
only 
— dental and vision benefits  $10  $25 
— reduction in Part B premium  $25 
 no 
reduction
total cost of extra Benefits  $1 $101
less rebate amount $123 $96
enrollee Premium $0 $
Note: The figures included in this table are for illustrative purposes only 
and do not reflect the health risk adjustments applied to benchmarks, bids, 
and plan payments. 
benchmark. The plan must use the Medicare payment in excess of its bid, 
known as the rebate, to fund extra benefits for enrollees. If the rebate is 
insufficient to cover the full package of extra benefits the plan offers, the 
enrollee must make up the difference, again through a premium.4 There 
is a more complicated system, described below, for setting benchmarks 
and payment amounts for regional PPOs.
rebates and extra Services
In 2006, 95 percent of MA plans bid less than the 
benchmark for core benefits and thus had some rebate 
amount to use for extra services. Plans may apply the 
rebate in any of four ways: 
reduced medicare cost sharing. They may reduce 
deductibles and coinsurance, replace coinsur-
ance with fixed copayments whose cost is less for 
an average beneficiary, or set an overall limit on 
enrollees’ out-of-pocket costs.5
additional services. They may cover services 
Medicare generally excludes, such as dental and 
vision care, or cover services beyond Medicare’s 
coverage limits, for example, by providing unlim-
ited inpatient hospital days.
Part B premium. They may reduce or eliminate 
the Part B premium.
Drug coverage. MA-PD plans, which include the 
Part D drug benefit, have a separate premium for 
the cost of the drug coverage. However, they may 
use some of the rebate amount established in the 
Part A/Part B bid process to reduce their Part D 
premium, often to zero.
Table 1 illustrates the possible results when two plans, 
both MA-PDs, bid against the 2007 benchmark of 
$882 for the District of Columbia. (Again for the sake 
of simplicity, the illustration assumes that the plans’ 
populations are an exact cross-section of District of 
Columbia beneficiaries. It thus omits the health risk 
adjustments applied to benchmarks, bids, and plan 
payments.) Although both plans bid below the bench-
mark, one has a lower bid for core benefits than the 
other and thus receives a larger rebate to fund extra 
benefits. Both plans reduce required Medicare cost 
sharing, perhaps using fixed copayments for services 
in place of Medicare’s deductibles and coinsurance. 







national health Policy forum  |  www.nhpf.org 7






% – 9.9% 20%
10% – 1.9% 18%
1% – 19.9% 17%
0% – .9% 12%
% – 9.9% 8%
0% or more 16%
total 100%
Source: Author’s analysis of CMS 2007 rate 
calculation data, available at www.cms.hhs.
gov/medicareadvtgspecratestats/Downloads/
calculationdata2007.zip, and of March 2007 
contract enrollment data, available at www.cms.hhs.
gov/MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/Downloads/MA 
Enrollment by SCC - March 2007.zip.
taBle 
Distribution of ma enrollees 
by 007 county Benchmarks 
relative to ffS costs 
cost; MA-PD 2 chooses instead to offer only basic drug coverage and to 
provide a more costly dental and vision package. MA-PD 1 has enough of 
its rebate left over to fund a partial reduction of the $93.50 Part B premium 
its enrollees would otherwise have to pay. 
In sum, the benefits an MA plan can offer beneficiaries and the premium it 
charges for those benefits depend on two basic variables: (i) the applicable 
benchmark for its service area and (ii) the plan’s relative “efficiency,” the 
extent to which it bids below the benchmark because of negotiated price 
discounts, care management, or other factors.
Setting Benchmarks
Under the MMA, the starting benchmark for each county is set equal to the 
higher of two amounts. The first is CMS’s estimate of average fee-for-service 
(FFS) Medicare costs in the county for the year the benefits are delivered, 
that is, the cost of furnishing the core Part A and B benefits to a typical 
beneficiary in the same county under the original Medicare program. The 
second is the payment rate set for the county in the preceding year, up-
dated for expected national average growth in Medicare spending. These 
updated rates, often grandfathered from before the MMA, are sometimes 
much higher than the FFS average, for reasons discussed below.
For the time being, the starting benchmark for each county is adjusted 
upwards, using a budget neutrality factor meant to account for the ef-
fects of health risk adjustment. As noted earlier, the actual calculation of 
Medicare payments and beneficiary premiums for a given plan includes 
adjustments if the plan’s enrollees score higher or lower than average 
under a health risk assessment system developed by CMS.6 Overall, 
the Medicare beneficiaries who have chosen to enroll in MA plans are 
healthier than those who remain in original Medicare, meaning that ag-
gregate payments to plans should be lower than they would be if plans 
enrolled a typical mix of beneficiaries. Instead, the budget neutrality 
adjustment prevents any risk-related reduction in overall payments to 
MA plans. A plan with lower-risk enrollees is still paid less than one 
with higher-risk enrollees, but all plans are paid more than they would 
be without the adjustment. This “hold harmless” rule will be phased 
out by 2010, but benchmarks for 2007 are still 3.9 percent higher than 
they would be if the budget neutrality adjustment were not used.
Because of the budget neutrality adjustment, all of the county bench-
marks for 2007 are above Medicare’s projected FFS costs. However, 
as Table 2 shows, the difference between benchmarks and FFS varies 
dramatically among counties. In 2007, 9 percent of MA plan enrollees 
are in counties where the benchmark is less than 5 percent above FFS, 
while 16 percent are in counties where the benchmark exceeds FFS 
by 30 percent or more. The different treatment of counties originated 
with the payment policy changes enacted in the Balanced Budget Act 
(BBA) of 1997. 
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From 1985 to 1998, payment rates for HMOs—the only kind of plan al-
lowed to contract with Medicare on a risk basis at that time—were set 
at 95 percent of each county’s FFS costs. The figure was known as the 
adjusted average per capita cost, or AAPCC. It was assumed that ef-
ficient HMOs would be able to provide core Medicare benefits at some 
even lower cost and would therefore be able to use the difference to offer 
attractive supplemental benefits. (In practice, many HMOs were being 
paid more than FFS costs for a comparable population because they were 
enrolling healthier-than-average beneficiaries and risk adjustment had 
not been implemented.)
Under this system, HMOs tended to operate in areas with higher FFS 
costs, usually large urban areas, because there was greater potential for 
savings in these areas. In addition, it has always been difficult for HMOs 
to establish an adequate provider network in rural or small urban areas. 
Because there might be only a few competing providers in the area, the 
plans might not have the leverage needed to negotiate favorable rates. 
Some utilization management activities, such as discharge planning, are 
also localized and can be costly to establish in rural areas. Even if an or-
ganization could overcome these barriers, it might not wish to incur the 
expenses needed to market its plan in an area with a small target popula-
tion of beneficiaries.
The BBA folded the existing HMO contracting program into a new 
Medicare+Choice program. The new program aimed to broaden the types 
of health plan choices available to beneficiaries, allowing contracts with 
new types of plans, including PPOs, PSOs, MSA plans, and PFFS plans. At 
the same time, it changed the payment system to reduce geographic varia-
tion and encourage plans to enter low-cost areas. Beginning in 1998, rates 
in the lowest-cost rural counties were set equal to a fixed “floor” amount 
that was higher than the counties’ FFS costs. (A separate urban floor was 
established in 2000.) The MMA grandfathered in the high benchmarks for 
“floor counties” by specifying that benchmarks are to be based on either 
the county’s benchmark for the previous year, with a fixed annual update, 
or its current FFS cost. This means that  counties with rates set well above 
FFS costs will go on having relatively high benchmarks permanently (un-
less growth in a county’s FFS costs brings that number above the inflated 
floor level). 
Plan efficiency and Plan Bids
The value of the additional benefits available to a plan’s enrollees depends 
on the difference between the plan’s bid for core Medicare benefits and 
the benchmark for its service area. Table 3 (next page) shows the Medicare 
Payment Advisory Commission’s (MedPAC’s) estimates of MA plan bids, 
rebates, and Medicare payments relative to FFS costs for 2006. It should 
be noted that MedPAC’s FFS cost estimates are about 2 percentage points 
lower than the estimates used by CMS in calculating benchmarks. This is 
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ma Plan Payments and Benchmarks relative to medicare 









Bid for medicare a/B 
Benefit as percent of FFS 
97% 108% 103% 109% 99%
rebate 
as percent of FFS 
13% 9% 7% 10% 1%
Payment (bid plus 
rebates) as percent of FFS 
110% 117% 110% 119% 11%
Benchmark 
as percent of FFS
115% 120% 112% 122% 11%
Source: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, Report to the Congress: Promoting Greater Effi-
ciency in Medicare, June 2007; available at www.medpac.gov/documents/Jun07_EntireReport.pdf.
because MedPAC factors out certain spending related to graduate medical 
education in teaching hospitals.7 All other benchmark/FFS comparisons in 
this report use the CMS numbers.
MA plans overall were bidding 99 percent of FFS (or about 97 percent, 
according to CMS) to furnish the core Medicare benefits. Benchmarks av-
eraged 16 percent more than FFS. Rebates available to fund supplemental 
benefits averaged 13 percent of FFS (75 percent of the difference between 
the 99 percent bid and the 116 percent benchmark). Only 1 percentage 
point of this amount was attributable to plan efficiency in furnishing core 
benefits, while the other 12 percentage points reflect the fact that bench-
marks exceeded FFS costs. 
HMOs were the only type of plan that actually furnished core Medicare 
benefits for less than the cost of original Medicare. Regional PPOs were 
slightly less efficient, and local PPOs considerably less so. Finally, PFFS 
plans were bidding 109 percent of FFS for core benefits. This is not sur-
prising: they pay full Medicare rates for services, incur higher adminis-
trative costs than the original Medicare program, and may have fewer 
mechanisms for controlling utilization than managed care plans. (A non-
network PFFS plan may have preauthorization or other control systems, 
but may not engage in selective contracting or provide financial incentives 
for reduced utilization.) The result is that extra benefits for enrollees were 
worth 10 percent of FFS costs--only about half of the 19 percent difference 
between FFS costs and Medicare payments to the PFFS plans.
Although CMS has not released MA bidding and payment figures for 
2007, it has reported that MA enrollees are receiving extra benefits with an 
average value of $86.19. This would be consistent with MedPAC’s findings 
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for 2006: nearly all extra benefits are funded through Medicare payments 
in excess of FFS costs. PFFS plans are again providing the least generous 
supplements, with an average value of about $63 a month.8
Plan Growth and competition
All Medicare beneficiaries now have access to one or more MA plans, 
compared to just 75 percent of beneficiaries in 2004.9 Virtually all benefi-
ciaries have access to a PFFS plan. As shown in Table 4, about 82 percent 
of beneficiaries have at least one HMO or other local CCP available, and 
most of the rest have access to a regional PPO. Fewer than 2 percent have 
only a PFFS option.
PFFS plans are nearly always competing with other 
types of plans. Yet they have gained 1.5 million new 
enrollees in the last two years, accounting for nearly 
two-thirds of total MA enrollment growth. The dramatic 
growth in PFFS enrollment followed the enactment of 
the MMA, but whether it is actually attributable to the 
MMA’s health plan provisions is unclear. The PFFS op-
tion has existed since 1998, and the counties with high 
PFFS enrollment had high payment rates relative to FFS 
costs before the MMA. However, some industry sources 
suggest that the MMA’s promise of annual benchmark 
increases equal to the growth in FFS spending made 
insurers more willing than before to invest in the devel-
opment of PFFS plans.
It is perhaps not surprising that PFFS plans have been 
able to compete with local PPOs, which bid nearly as 
much for core benefits and may not be able to offer 
more attractive benefits than PFFS plans in the same 
area. Regional PPOs have not gained much of a foothold 
anywhere, for reasons considered later in this paper. 
However, 63 percent of all PFFS enrollees live in a county 
that is also served by an HMO.
Table 5 (next page) shows PFFS penetration (enrollment as a percent of 
the beneficiary population) in areas with and without an HMO option. 
In areas with no HMO, penetration rates rise directly with the difference 
between the local benchmark and FFS costs. In areas with an HMO, the 
HMOs attract roughly the same proportion of Medicare beneficiaries at 
each benchmark level. PFFS enrollment in these areas is negligible until 
benchmarks are 20 percent or more above FFS.
As was shown earlier, HMOs are on average considerably more efficient 
than PFFS plans. All else being equal, an HMO ought to be able to offer 
better benefits than a PFFS plan in the same area. This may not be true 
in some rural areas, where HMOs must spread their fixed costs over a 
taBle 
Beneficiary access to ma Plans 





local ccP available 9.0% 81.9%
– HMo available 39.2% 75.8%
– local PPo or PSo only 9.9% 6.1%
PffS only .0% 1.%
PffS and regional PPo .9% 1.%
total† 100.0% 100.0%
* December 2005; latest data available.
† Includes one county with only an MSA plan available.
Note: Excludes plans available only to employer groups. Numbers may 
not sum because of rounding.
Source: Author’s analysis of CMS, Medicare Compare database as of March 
15, 2007, update available at www.medicare.gov/Download/Download 
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smaller number of enrollees and may have to offer providers more than 
Medicare rates to participate in a network. Moreover, in areas with very 
high benchmarks, even less efficient PFFS plans may still be able offer at-
tractive supplemental coverage.
Some beneficiaries choosing PFFS plans may be doing so for reasons 
unrelated to their relative value. One obvious explanation is that many 
beneficiaries are wary of restrictive networks. Even if HMOs in a given area 
can offer better benefits, the difference may not always be large enough 
to outweigh a preference for free choice of providers. Other factors may 
also contribute to their choices. Enrollees may have difficulty evaluating 
different benefit packages and cannot easily identify the better deal. Or a 
plan that is inferior to another in actuarial terms—that is, when measured 
against the needs of a fully representative group of beneficiaries—may be 
better suited to the needs of specific subgroups. 
Finally, some observers have noted that employers are showing increas-
ing interest in offering the PFFS option to their retirees. Because PFFS 
plans are available everywhere, they can serve groups whose retirees 
are geographically dispersed, and retirees may be less likely to object 
to being pushed into a PFFS plan than into a managed care arrangement. 
In addition, employers can negotiate a PFFS contract tailored to resemble 
the benefits offered to active employees.10 
taBle 
PffS and hmo Penetration rates, by Percent Difference Between Benchmark and ffS costs
Source: Author’s analysis of the following: CMS 
2007 rate calculation data, available at www.
cms.hhs.gov/medicareadvtgspecratestats/
Downloads/calculat iondata2007.zip; 
Medicare Compare database as of March 
15, 2007; CMS December 2005 county 
beneficiary data, available at www.cms.hhs.
gov/HealthPlanRepFileData/Downloads/
SC-2005.zip; and March 2007 contract 
enrollment data, available at www.cms.hhs.
gov/MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/Downloads/
MA Enrollment by SCC - March 2007.zip.
 Difference Between Benchmark and ffS costs 





Beneficiaries* 2,676,000 4,363,000 2,371,000 890,000 10,301,000
PffS enrollees† 69,000 189,000 159,000 74,000 491,000
% of Beneficiaries 
enrolled in PffS Plans 






Beneficiaries* 10,131,000 12,008,000 6,837,000 3,196,000 32,171,000
PffS enrollees† 114,000 271,000 298,000 155,000 837,000
% of Beneficiaries 
enrolled in PffS Plans 
1.1% 2.3% 4.4% 4.8% 2.6%
hmo enrollees† 1,656,000 1,981,000 930,000 548,000 5,116,000
% of Beneficiaries 
enrolled in hmos 
16.3% 16.5% 13.6% 17.1% 15.9%
* December 2005; latest data available
† March 2007
 Note: HMO enrollment figures exclude 0.5 million enrollees living in a 
county not in the service area of any HMO.
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the DeBate oVer BenchmarK leVelS
Medicare pays MA plans considerably more than it would have spent if 
the plans’ enrollees had remained in original Medicare. MedPAC and oth-
ers have recommended ultimately setting benchmarks at 100 percent of 
FFS costs in all counties.11 The Children’s Health and Medicare Protection 
Act of 2007 (H.R. 3162), passed by the House in August 2007, would have 
retained the current benchmarks for 2008 but would then have begun a 
three-year phase-down, with all benchmarks for 2011 set equal to FFS costs. 
(This provision was not included in the revised child health legislation 
considerered in September 2007.) The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
projected that this change and other technical changes in the benchmark 
calculation would have resulted in Medicare savings of $50.4 billion over 
the five years from 2008 through 2012. (Note that this estimate assumed 
a slowdown in MA enrollment growth as well as reductions in payments 
for current enrollees.)12 Medicare beneficiaries who are not in MA plans 
would also have saved money. Because MA plan payments are included in 
the calculation of the Part B premium, payments to plans in excess of FFS 
costs raise the premium by about $2 per month.13 MedPAC has suggested 
some alternative transitional approaches, including freezing benchmarks 
that are above FFS at the current level until FFS spending in the county 
catches up with the benchmark or setting a fixed upper limit on the amount 
by which a county’s benchmark could exceed FFS.14
Critics of the current payment system contend that, while private plans 
should remain an option for beneficiaries, they should be expected to 
operate at least as efficiently as original Medicare. CMS, the insurance in-
dustry, and others argue that MA plans are a vital source of supplemental 
coverage for low-income and minority beneficiaries. Reduced benchmarks 
could drive plans out of the program, especially in the areas where MA 
options have only recently become available, and would force others to 
curb benefits. Finally, some argue that FFS costs, which reflect federally 
administered prices, are an artificial target, and that reliance on the private 
market could improve efficiency in the long run.
There is also a more general argument that private plans may offer im-
proved access, quality, and coordination of care and may be able to help 
manage the chronic illnesses that are likely to be the major drivers of fu-
ture Medicare spending. CMS and health plans have offered a variety of 
comparisons of enrollee satisfaction in MA plans and original Medicare, 
along with examples of successful disease management and care coordina-
tion programs.15 The examples are confined to CCPs, not the fast-growing 
PFFS plans, and little information is available about the outcomes of these 
programs.16 And it is not clear that enrollment in capitated private health 
plans is the only way to improve coordination. CMS is funding numerous 
demonstration programs that provide disease management or coordinate 
care for chronically ill beneficiaries in original Medicare.17 While assess-
ment of various approaches for improving care is beyond the scope of this 
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paper, MA plans’ potential in this area must certainly be considered when 
weighing options for payment policy.
Benefits for low-income and minority enrollees
Even before the MMA, Medicare+Choice plans were an important source 
of supplemental coverage for beneficiaries whose incomes were too high 
to qualify for Medicaid and who could not afford 
to purchase Medigap coverage. In most states, 
Medicaid covers Medicare premiums and cost 
sharing only for beneficiaries with incomes below 
the poverty level, $10,210 for a single person and 
$13,690 for a couple in 2007, and with limited as-
sets. (Beneficiaries with slightly higher incomes 
may receive assistance with the Part B premium, 
but not with deductibles and coinsurance.)
Table 6 shows estimates by America’s Health 
Insurance Plans (AHIP) of coverage in 2004 for 
noninstitutionalized “active choosers,” Medicare 
beneficiaries who lived in an area served by at 
least one MA plan and who did not have employer 
coverage or qualify for Medicaid. Minority ben-
eficiaries were considerably more likely to rely 
on MA than to buy Medigap. Beneficiaries with 
incomes below $40,000 were also more likely to 
choose MA plans than Medigap, although the 
difference diminished as income rose.
On the other hand, a Kaiser Foundation study us-
ing 2005 data found no clear relationship between 
low income and MA enrollment. The lowest-in-
come beneficiaries were equally likely to be in MA 
or Medigap, while those in the $10,000 to $20,000 
income range were more likely to choose Medigap. 
Note, however, that this study, unlike the AHIP 
estimates, was not limited to areas in which an 
MA plan was available, and thus may not reflect 
the behavior of beneficiaries who actually had a 
choice between MA and Medigap.18
Data for more recent years are not yet available, 
so there is no way of knowing what kinds of ben-
eficiaries have been joining MA plans during the 
recent period of rapid enrollment increases. One 
factor that might have affected enrollment is the 
availability of low-income subsidies for Part D pre-
scription drug coverage beginning in 2006. Before 
the implementation of Part D, some low-income 
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people who were not eligible for drug cov-
erage through Medicaid might have joined 
an MA plan specifically to obtain low-cost 
drug coverage. Now that they have an af-
fordable alternative, they may be less likely 
to choose MA plans. As of June 2006, 447,000 
non-Medicaid drug subsidy recipients were 
in MA-PDs, while 2.2 million had chosen a 
stand-alone prescription drug plan.19 (Some 
people in stand-alone plans may also be 
enrolled in a PFFS plan that does not offer 
drug coverage.)
Whatever the recent developments, the cur-
rent payment system is an inefficient way 
of targeting assistance with supplemental 
coverage. Table 7 shows data from the March 
supplements to the Current Population Sur-
vey (CPS) conducted by the Census Bureau; 
three-year averages are used to improve reli-
ability. Because CPS allows analysis only at 
the level of states, benchmarks are based on 
population-weighted averages of all counties 
within each state.
The share of non-Medicaid beneficiaries with incomes below 200 percent 
of poverty is about the same in states with comparatively low and com-
paratively high benchmarks. The same is true for Hispanic and non-His-
panic black beneficiaries, except that they account for a smaller share of 
beneficiaries in the states where average benchmarks are highest. The value 
of supplemental benefits financed through high benchmarks depends on 
where beneficiaries live, rather than on how much assistance they need.
Plan availability
One recent analysis has contended that reducing benchmarks to 100 
percent of FFS “would effectively eliminate PFFS as a plan offering.”20 
This seems likely: PFFS plans bid 109 percent of FFS for core Medicare 
benefits in 2006. To operate, they would have to charge a beneficiary pre-
mium equal to 9 percent of FFS simply to provide the core benefits, with 
no extra coverage at all. However, most beneficiaries in areas not served 
by a local CCP have access to at least one regional PPO, as well as a PFFS 
plan. The question is, would the regional PPOs also disappear, or might 
they continue to be available as an alternative in areas that have failed to 
attract any local HMO or PPO?
The MMA established a separate system for setting regional PPO bench-
marks. For each of the 26 regions, the benchmark is a blend of a statutory 
component, based on a beneficiary-weighted average of the benchmarks 
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for the counties in the region, and a component based on the actual bids 
submitted by the PPOs in the region for core benefits. In 2007 the blend 
is about 85 percent statutory and 15 percent plan bids; the bids in the dif-
ferent regions move the final benchmark about 1 percent higher or lower 
than the statutory component.
Note that the statutory component is based on weighted average bench-
marks for all Medicare beneficiaries in the region, not for those who have 
enrolled in regional PPOs. This means that, in low-cost counties, the 
benchmark is higher than the individual benchmarks for those counties, 
giving the regional PPO a competitive advantage over any local plans in 
those counties. Conversely, the regional benchmark will be lower than the 
individual benchmarks in high-cost counties, leaving regional PPOs less 
able to compete with the local HMOs already operating in those areas. 
After the MMA was enacted, some observers predicted that regional 
PPOs might move to exploit the benchmarking system by marketing 
heavily in low-cost counties where no local HMOs or PPOs operated. In 
one scenario,21 they were projected to enroll as many as 4 million ben-
eficiaries, at an average cost per enrollee of $1,600 above FFS. In fact, the 
regional PPOs have enrolled only 156,645 beneficiaries as of June 2007, 
and their enrollment is only slightly tilted toward lower-cost areas. The 
current statutory component is 117 percent of FFS, based on March 2007 
enrollment distribution. If the statutory component were based on an 
average of the benchmarks for the enrollees’ counties, rather than for all 
beneficiaries in the region used, it would be about 114 percent of FFS. 
This suggests that the PPOs have been only somewhat successful in tar-
geting low-cost counties, perhaps because of problems in establishing a 
satisfactory network in those counties or because of barriers to marketing 
in sparsely populated areas.
If county-level benchmarks were set at 100 percent of FFS, but the cur-
rent weighting system for regional PPOs were continued, their statutory 
component would drop to 103 percent of FFS. This is equal to the regional 
PPOs’ bids for core Medicare benefits in 2006, meaning that they would at 
best break even on those benefits and would have to finance any supple-
mental benefits entirely through enrollee premiums or become more ef-
ficient. Even so, regional PPOs might be able to compete favorably with 
the major non-MA option for supplemental coverage, individual Medigap 
plans. Medigap carriers have to cover all their administrative costs and 
desired surplus on the fraction of spending represented by Medicare cost 
sharing, while the PPOs can spread these costs over the full Medicare 
spending amounts. 
However, the very narrow excess of the regional benchmarks over FFS 
would continue to be available only if the plans could maintain the current 
mix of enrollees in high-cost and low-cost counties. Even a slight shift of 
the distribution of enrollees toward higher-cost counties could mean that 
the PPOs would lose money on the core benefits. In effect, the current rules 
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for county benchmarks have provided the regional PPOs with a cushion 
against the risk of unfavorable enrollee distribution. If this cushion were 
taken away, it seems unlikely that organizations would continue to offer 
the regional PPO model.
ffS costs as an artificial target
Original Medicare operates as what economists call a monopsony—a buyer 
with so much power in the market that it can more or less pay whatever 
prices it chooses to dictate. No hospital, and very few physicians, can af-
ford to refuse Medicare patients altogether, but they may prefer to treat 
other patients when Medicare demands steep discounts from the rates 
paid by other insurers. As a result Congress is continually walking a tight-
rope between controlling Medicare spending and maintaining adequate 
access to care. In some areas, it may be paying less than a market price 
for services, and in others more. At least in theory, competition among 
private health plans would more nearly ensure that providers were being 
paid the “right” prices than the current system of administratively set FFS 
payment rates.
As CBO puts it, without necessarily endorsing the concept:
Another argument is that private plans should not be expected to provide 
Medicare services in all markets at a cost that is less than per capita FFS 
spending because Medicare may be able to use its market power to set 
FFS payment rates at levels below those that are determined through pri-
vate-market forces. Below-market payments to health care providers may 
result in a less-efficient allocation of resources than would be achieved if 
more beneficiaries were enrolled in private plans that paid providers at 
rates determined in the market.22
This argument is somewhat paradoxical when applied to the current 
system. PFFS plans are allowed to pay the same administered prices that 
Medicare pays. It had originally been thought that non-network PFFS plans 
might pay more than Medicare rates in order to ensure access to care for 
their enrollees, but instead they appear generally to be paying 100 percent 
of FFS. (Whether some providers will actually accept PFFS patients at these 
rates has been questioned by consumer advocates.)23 Other types of plans 
are more likely negotiating prices, but their payments from Medicare are 
still largely based on benchmarks that are either arbitrary (in the case of 
floor counties) or ultimately derived in part from original Medicare’s own 
price levels.
In a more fully market-driven system, Medicare benchmarks or payments 
might be set by competition among the health plans—much as Medicare 
contributions to prescription drug plans are now determined by average 
plan bids for the basic benefit. The MMA actually provides for such a sys-
tem on a demonstration basis, beginning in 2010. In up to six metropolitan 
areas, Medicare contributions for both original Medicare and MA enrollees 
would be based on a blend of FFS costs and local MA plan bids for core 
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benefits. Beneficiaries choosing less costly plans would get extra benefits, 
as in the current system; those choosing more costly plans (including, if 
applicable, original Medicare) would pay a higher Part B premium, sub-
ject to caps. Similar demonstrations of “premium support” systems have 
been proposed in the past, but have failed to get off the ground, either 
because health plans themselves were not interested or because members 
of Congress raised “not in my backyard” objections.24 Some people think 
the MMA demonstrations will face even greater barriers, because—unlike 
the previous demonstrations—they would include original Medicare. In 
any event, numerous technical issues will need to be resolved before the 
MMA demonstrations can begin.25
Geographic Variation
Before the 1997 BBA, Medicare payment rates for health plans were set 
at 95 percent of FFS costs. If a plan could cover the core benefits at 85 
percent of FFS, then it could offer enrollees $75 worth of extra benefits 
in a county where FFS costs were $750 a month, but only $35 worth in a 
county where FFS costs were $350. The implicit premise of the program 
was that beneficiaries in high-cost counties should be encouraged to join 
private plans, because Medicare’s nominal 5 percent savings would be 
higher in those counties.
The BBA essentially inverted this principle by squeezing down payment 
rates in high-cost counties and raising them to an arbitrary floor in low-
cost counties. The ultimate goal was to transition to a system of uniform 
national rates, with adjustments only for local input prices, such as hospital 
wages or office rental costs. The assumption behind the BBA was that the 
previous system might make extra benefits available to beneficiaries in 
areas where providers were inefficient or provided unnecessary services, 
while denying these benefits to beneficiaries in areas where providers 
operated efficiently. Uniform rates would compel plans in high-cost coun-
ties to dramatically improve their management of care, while beneficiaries 
in low-cost counties would be rewarded with extra benefits even if their 
health plans operated at higher cost than original Medicare.
The current benchmark system stands more or less midway between the 
pre- and post-BBA approaches. Benchmarks as a percentage of FFS are 
higher in low-cost areas. In absolute dollars, however, benchmarks are 
still higher in high-cost counties. Because high-cost areas may have more 
unnecessary utilization, plans in those areas may have more opportunity 
to achieve savings. In addition, these areas have tended to attract the 
most efficient types of plans, while the less efficient PFFS plans are con-
centrated in low-cost areas. The result has been that the most generous 
benefits are available in two types of counties: those where FFS costs are 
so high that plans can achieve large savings, and those where benchmarks 
are so far above FFS costs that even an inefficient plan can save money. 
Less extensive benefits are available in areas with FFS costs in the middle 
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range, because plans in these areas have less chance for efficiency gains 
than in the highest-cost areas and relatively lower benchmarks than in 
the lowest-cost areas.
Setting all benchmarks at 100 percent of FFS would more or less return the 
program to its pre-BBA state: beneficiaries would get free extra benefits 
only in areas with high (and arguably unnecessary) utilization, while 
those in areas where FFS providers operated more efficiently might not 
have access to plans.26 This would raise again the equity issue the BBA 
was meant to resolve. 
Possibly the key barrier to developing a fair system is the problem of 
quantifying differences in “efficiency” of the FFS program in different 
geographic areas. The BBA’s formulas assumed that any cost differences 
that could not be traced directly to differences in local wages and other 
input prices must reflect overservice in some places and insufficient levels 
of service in others. But there could be many other factors affecting lo-
cal costs, such as differences in population needs or in relative access to 
beneficial technologies. Some beneficiaries may be getting too much care 
and others too little, and it might never be possible to develop a formula 
that could identify precisely how much utilization in high-cost areas is 
“unnecessary.” The difficulty of establishing a fair system based on FFS 
experience might be another argument for pursuing the bid-based com-
petitive approach discussed in the preceding section. 
concluSion
Whatever the outcome of the current debate on MA plan payment, bench-
marks are already scheduled to temporarily grow more slowly than FFS 
costs, because of the phase-out of the budget neutrality factor for risk 
adjustment. The minimum difference between benchmarks and FFS costs 
will drop from 3.9 percent in 2007 to 1.7 percent in 2008. If all counties’ 
FFS cost levels grow at equal rates, by 2010 benchmarks will be equal to 
FFS costs in areas where 7.5 percent of MA plan enrollees live. Proposals 
to change the way benchmarks are set might, then, have little effect on the 
established Medicare HMOs, which have been operating in high-cost areas 
for more than 20 years. If they can continue to operate more efficiently 
than other plans, they might still be able to offer at least a modest package 
of free extra benefits.
The component of the program that would be affected by benchmark re-
ductions would be the PFFS sector, which has emerged only recently and 
which some might say is functioning in effect as a pass-through for Medi-
care financing of extra benefits for certain groups of beneficiaries. These 
extra benefits are really at the center of the debate. Medicare continues 
to expose many beneficiaries to potentially catastrophic costs, especially 
beneficiaries whose incomes are too high to qualify for Medicaid and who 
cannot afford private Medigap coverage. For the time being, the private 
plan option is serving as an ad hoc solution, although it is not equally 
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available to all beneficiaries in need and may be providing assistance to 
many higher-income beneficiaries.
If at least one of the policy goals of the MA program is to help modest-
income beneficiaries obtain additional benefits, there may be a number of 
better ways of targeting assistance. One is to expand or at least standard-
ize eligibility for the Medicare Savings Programs, under which Medicaid 
covers Medicare premiums and sometimes cost sharing for low-income 
beneficiaries. Eligibility for this coverage varies considerably among 
states because of different decisions about income-determination meth-
odologies and allowable assets.27 Another is to improve basic Medicare 
coverage, either by “modernizing” the benefits to include catastrophic 
limits and other cost-sharing changes or by providing a low-cost volun-
tary FFS Medicare supplement.28 These proposals are beyond the scope 
of this paper and may have little chance of adoption in the current bud-
getary environment. But it might also be possible to improve targeting 
within the MA program itself.
For example, the amounts now paid in excess of FFS could be replaced 
by a low-income subsidy system for MA plan premiums related to Part A 
and Part B benefits that is comparable to the subsidies now available for 
Part D premiums. With reduced benchmarks, MA plans would have to 
charge higher premiums for supplemental benefits, but the increases could 
then be offset through subsidies for enrollees meeting specified income 
eligibility standards. While this approach might preserve benefit levels 
for some current low-income enrollees, there could still be many areas in 
which no private plan was available at all. 
Private plans have higher administrative costs than original Medicare, 
because they perform some activities Medicare does not (such as market-
ing), may not be able to match Medicare’s economies of scale, and, in the 
case of investor-owned plans, must provide earnings for shareholders. 
Some plans have been able to offset these costs by furnishing benefits 
more efficiently, most commonly in areas where Medicare FFS costs are 
high. In other areas, plans have been able to operate only because of the 
extra financing provided by the current payment system. Changing that 
system now may be politically difficult, because many beneficiaries might 
lose access to low-cost benefits. But change might be even harder in the 
future, if recent enrollment trends continue and millions of additional 
beneficiaries come to rely on the program.
While the current focus is on the budgetary implications of MA payment, 
there is also a need to bring stability and consistency to the program, so 
that insurers can make the long-term investments needed to improve 
quality and efficiency and so that beneficiaries can find a medical home 
in their health plans. The current scrutiny of the program presents an 
opportunity for Congress to reassess its overall goals in promoting the 
private plan option and to ensure that payment policies are rationally 
aligned with those goals.
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